讲座题目：Does Relative Framing and Minimum Level Increase Public Good Contributions？
主持：邓卫广 mg4355经济与贸易学院国际贸易系助理教授 香港中文大学经济学博士
Individual contributions to public goods can be framed in absolute amount or as a relative proportion of one’s income. This paper examines the effect of such framing on contributions of group members to a public good in a laboratory experiment. The framing effect can be resulted from shifting of reference points or fairness awareness. In our experiment, members in a group have high and low two endowments types and they play public good games both without and with minimum contribution levels (MCLs). As a treatment, both the contribution metric and MCLs are expressed either in absolute amount or as a relative proportion of a group member’s endowment. The MCL is different in absolute amount for the high and low type members, but it is the same proportion of their endowments for the two types. The number of high endowment members also varies as a treatment to group composition. We find some important results that are consistent with our hypotheses. First, without MCL, the relative metric significantly reduces contributions, especially for the low types; the reduction also comes from more free riders. Second, the introduction of MCL significantly increases contributions. Third, the relative framing of MCL increases contributions more than the absolute MCL, therefore the difference between absolute condition and relative condition almost disappear after MCL is introduced. Fourth, the average group contribution is increased by the number of high type members in a group. We discuss theories and implications of these findings.
中国人民大学经济学院教授。1996年博士毕业于美国卡耐基梅隆大学。曾在美国SAS研究有限企业和世界银行从事研究工作。主持多项国家自然科学基金面上项目。2014-2016年期间担任世界经济论坛全球战略委员会(Global Agenda Councils)行为分会委员。
论文发表在Quarterly Journal of Economics, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Journal of Economic Psychology，Journal of Comparative Economics,《世界经济》，《金融研究》等国际国内顶尖学术刊物上。
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